Abstract
Introduction
Slovenian foreign policy has received a lot of attention in literature.
Studies provide theoretical and empirical evidence of various aspects of foreign policy analysis -for example, the organization and conduct of the foreign policy process and its individual instruments, mainly diplomacy (Brglez 1996; Udovič and Brglez 2011; Jazbec 2012) , Europeanization of foreign policy (Kajnč 2011; Šabič and Bunič 2013; Bojinović Fenko and Lovec 2015) , analyses of foreign policy content (decisions) (Bojinović 2005) , and strategy in bilateral (neighbouring), regional (European) and relevant global issues (Bučar 1994 (Bučar , 1995 Bojinović Fenko and Požgan 2014; Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014) . The least systematically researched area remains the foreign policy environment. So far, it has been addressed mostly through the prisms of 'smallness' and the 'youth' of the Slovenian state.
1 Consequently, there has been limited research around the presupposition that -like for all small states -the foreign environment in terms of limitations from the international system automatically prevails by decisively determining constraints for Slovenian foreign policy (Hey 2003) . In this respect, we propose to broaden the research agenda by focusing on the interplay between foreign and domestic foreign policy environments. To do so, we first provide a definition of the foreign policy environment. The term is widely used in foreign policy analysis and rests on two different classifications: factor analysis of the internal-external foreign policy environment (Hill 2016) and the levels of analysis of the domesticforeign dichotomy of the foreign policy environment (Russett and Starr 1981; Kinsella, Russett and Starr 2013; Hudson 2014) . This conceptualization reveals how foreign policy substance and the foreign policy making process are influenced by: a) the internal foreign policy environment; b) the external domestic foreign policy environment, defined mostly as the statebuilding environment; and c) the external foreign policy environment. The research question pursued here is how these three types of foreign policy environment influence foreign policy, whereby the term 'influence' means the extent of opportunities or constraints for foreign policy action. We assume that foreign policy is a continuous process; hence an additional question that we ask is how feedback on foreign policy actions (from the 1 A notable exception is the investigation of the geographical proximity and historical context of Slovenia in relation to the Balkans (Bojinović 2005 ).
external foreign environment) affects the domestic external and internal environments, either through self-perception or via policy-making.
The structure of the article is as follows. We first conceptualize the foreign policy environment and state building, focusing on their interplay. We then look at opportunities and constraints for taking foreign policy action. We do this by dividing the analysis into three time periods; pre-independence paradiplomacy until 1992; the consolidation of the state until 2004 membership of Euro-Atlantic integrations; and the 'mature statehood' period, in which Slovenia's foreign policy orientation is challenged by international crises which follow one after the other since the financial crisis in [2007] [2008] . Methodologically, the article departs from understanding foreign policy as a policy (in terms of the content of decisions) and as a policy-making process (Carlsnaes 2012) , thereby employing social constructivist epistemological grounds of constant interplay between the structure (the foreign policy environment) and the actors (decisionmakers). The three-period historical analysis focuses on general normative foreign policy positions in strategic documents (self-perception and internal environment) and on selected foreign policy situations leading to concrete foreign policy decisions by Slovenian decision-makers.
Foreign policy environments as sources of opportunities and constraints for action
There are two different but complementary approaches to states' foreign policy environment. The internal-external divide follows Hill's conceptualization (2016: 176) , where the internal environment corresponds to "the social and political process by which the actor comes to its choices" (Hill 2016: 183) , meaning factors and actors directly involved in the foreign policy process. This environment thus includes decision-makers (in terms of their individual characteristics and their roles) and rules and norms in foreign policy-making (Kinsella, Russett and Starr 2013: 13-15) . The external foreign policy environment, for its part, includes material and semi-material factors of the state and its society, such as demography, culture and image, including geopolitical and historical self-perception and consequently recognition of the state (Hill 2016: 176-184) , and factors of international political interdependence -international governmental organizations, transnational processes, international law, foreign policies of other states and the nature and the position of the state in the international system. Kinsella, Russett and Starr (2013: Chapter 1) , however, use the concept of levels of analysis to analyse the foreign policy environment. Levels of analysis are defined as "points on an ordered scale of size and complexity. These levels include units whose behaviour we attempt to describe, predict or explain, as well as units whose impact on individual decision-makers we examine" (Russett and Starr 1996: 11) . The earlier approach, which used six levels of analysis (Russett and Starr 1996: 11) , 2 has been narrowed down to three (Kinsella, Russett and Starr 2013: Chapter 1) . These are decision-makers and domestic society as the domestic environment levels of analysis, and global society as the foreign environment. External material and semi-material factors directly correspond to the domestic society level of analysis, whereas international political interdependence factors equal the global society level of analysis. 
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Source: Authors' own illustration based on Kinsella et al. (2013) and Hill (2016) In sum (Figure 1 ), foreign policy substance and policy-making are influenced by: a) the internal foreign policy environment and, within that, by 'decision-makers'; b) external semi-material factors, equalling domestic society and government levels of analysis; and c) international interdependence or the global society level of analysis as the external 2 The previous six levels were individual, role, government, society, relations and international system (Russett and Starr 1996) .
foreign environment. The environments enable foreign policy action by offering incentives and stimulative influence (i.e. opportunities) and/ or constrain action due to negative influences preventing realization of some choices. In the following sections, we will elaborate on this conceptualization by looking at how various types of the foreign policy environment influence foreign policy-making in terms of opportunities and constraints.
Pre-independence paradiplomacy: from the 1970s until international recognition in 1992
As a Socialist Republic, paradiplomacy was used by Slovenia after the 1970s. Defined essentially as "the diplomatic practices, the international activities or the foreign policies of sub-state political entities" (Duran 2016 : 1), paradiplomacy has also been interpreted as "an instance of diplomatic mediation of separation or estrangement […] striking a middle-ground between the realist power play and the humanist need to connect and to engage with others" (Duran 2016: 4-5) . As a former Yugoslav republic, Slovenia resorted to paradiplomacy to connect and engage internationally. During the break-up of Yugoslavia, Slovenian paradiplomacy took on an entirely new meaning: it was used as a tool to promote and achieve independence. In this section, we look at internal, external domestic and external foreign factors which influenced Slovenian foreign policy making at the time when Slovenia was still one of the six Yugoslav republics.
The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution (Art. 271) allowed the constituent republics to exercise their individual external relations, primarily in the fields of trade, culture, science and sports. These activities were limited to what is conceptually referred to as 'external relations' rather than 'foreign policy' (Hill 2016: 6) ; the Constitution did not allow the republics to conduct independent foreign policies (Art. 281: pt. 7). Whatever their own international activities, they had to be in conformity with the principles of the federal foreign policy (Yugoslav Constitution: Fundamental Principles pt. VII). In this respect, the normative basis of Slovenian paradiplomacy after 1975 was of a general collaborative nature and not part of a political programme with specific foreign policy content. (Jazbec 2011). multilateral level (Boeckh 2014) . 4 Jazbec (2011: 118) has pointed out that non-governmental paradiplomacy came to the fore only in the mid-1980s when these actors actively participated in the promotion of Slovenian democratization. This, in Duran's terms (2016: 4) , can be understood as a turning point of "connecting to engage with others".
Some of the central values on which the state based its foreign policy activities derived from the nature of the domestic democratization movement. For the latter, it was essential to assure the legality of action, otherwise infringement of the Yugoslav constitution would have given the federal government and the Yugoslav Army an opportunity to legally intervene in Slovenia (Bučar 2014) . Since the federal and international legal principles were the main constraints for Slovenian foreign policy action towards independence, the politicians decided to respect them and act where they were "allowed": they kept changing the Slovenian constitution and, via paradiplomacy, called upon the legitimacy of its "foreign policy" decision. Thus, it was imperative 1) to hold a plebiscite before declaring independence and 2) to respect the federal constitution with reference to the de facto implementation of independence (Bučar 2014: 205) . 5 The crucial factor for foreign policy action was thus the selfperception of the society and political groupings to respect the rule of (international) law in order to construct the state as a proper democracy. The 'othering' of Yugoslavia based on developing its own identity, closer to Western democratic values, remained at the core of Slovenian advocacy for its independence after the War. Opposing the dominant discourse of the federal Yugoslav authorities, Slovenia consolidated its identity around the will to implement democratic principles, respect for human rights and international law, hoping that such a self-identification would help it be perceived as a legitimate actor in the fast-restructuring of the post-Cold War international arena. These core values were included in the Constitution of Slovenia -e.g. the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Preamble, Arts. 3, 5, entire Title II, Arts. 14-65, Art.
159), of the rights of national minorities (Art. 5), the rights of foreigners (Art.
13), of foreign workers (Art. 79), the property-acquisition rights of foreigners (Art. 68), the principle of self-determination of peoples (Preamble, Art. 3a), of democracy (Arts. 1, 3, 3a), the rule of law (Arts. 2, 3a), of social welfare (Art. 2), of territorial integrity (Art. 4), the principles of secularism, freedom and equality of religion(s) (Art.7), the subjection of national laws to general principles of international law and to binding international treaties (Arts. 8:
153), the declaration of war and state of emergency only by the National Assembly (Art. 92), and the building of national defence on the principle of the "peaceful policy and culture of peace", the oversight of which is conducted by the National Assembly (Art. 124).
In terms of more specific goals of Slovenian foreign policy in the wake of Yugoslavia at the Brioni (Croatia) meeting on 7 July 1991 (Rupel 1996: 192-193 or the Council of Europe, was seen as strategic in the sense of clearing the path to the desired goal.
7
The second important element of the internal foreign policy environment was the construction of the foreign policy system in terms of its institutions (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service and diplomatic missions) and processes (Foreign Policy Act). This was the first and very challenging task 6 For a detailed analysis of Slovenian external domestic environment linkages to Western European flows (history, culture, trade) as an element of a cost-benefit analysis for pro-European integration, see Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič (2017) . • diplomatic-consular representations and diplomatic missions with other states;
• representatives with the role and status of honorary consuls;
• common representation with the Ljubljanska banka (a state-owned bank) or other Slovenian companies abroad;
• representation of Slovenian national interests through third states The external domestic environment was identified as insufficiently developed for independent statehood, as the existing system of governance in Slovenia did not have the authority and appropriate organizational structures in essential areas of independent statehood: foreign affairs, finance, taxation, a customs system and the military (Bučar 2014: 208-209) . The build-up of the structures was enabled by the Slovenian external domestic environment. Slovenia needed to demonstrate very quickly that it was able not only to establish and sustain border control in particular (in terms of military security and with respect to control of trade flows), but also to keep up democratic standards as referred to above (Bučar 2014: 210) .
In terms of the external foreign environment, the factors that played a considerable role in Slovenia's effort to become an independent state It is worth noting that the breakup of Yugoslavia challenged an important international norm, the principle of the right of self-determination, which was introduced in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Yet one needs to recall also the conflicting nature of the Helsinki principles because they also include the principle of preserving territorial integrity of states. To square the circle, "the Europeans chose to adapt their norms to their preferences and apply both principles to the federal republics as if they already were States and bearers of national sovereignty and as if international law did not oblige them to apply /these two principles/ to the Yugoslav state, its entire population and its external borders" (Woodward 1996 cited in Roberts 2016: 12). Roberts (2016: 12-15) has noted in his recent book Conversations with Milošević that such change of course was positive for Slovenia but detrimental to some other Yugoslav republics. He sees this as a shortcoming of European foreign policy which originated from prioritizing maintenance of unity among European Community member states at the expense of a long-term vision for all Yugoslav nations' future.
The internal environment of foreign policy during this period prioritized the consolidation of the foreign policy system at the expense of substantive strategic orientation. There was no foreign policy strategic document officially endorsed until 1999. The most important element of selfidentification was democracy -respect of human rights, respect of the international law triangle and dissociation of the state from geographical proximity and the historical context of the Balkans (Bojinović 2005) . In this context, the 'away from the Balkans' approach was pursued in order to associate Slovenia with Western democracies' form of international cooperation, proving Slovenia was a democratic country which did not belong to the war-waging region (Bojinović Fenko and Požgan 2014: 59-62 experience in this respect took place in 1998, when Slovenia withdrew from the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), the group it helped to establish, and which advocated nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. (Rupel et al. 2000: 7) .
With respect to the external domestic environment, the Slovenian 'away from the Balkans' approach gradually changed into a more inclusive (creative) way of thinking about that region; but the path to get there had many turns. For starters, an independent Slovenia wasted no time severing ties with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). At first sight, that seemed a logical move, since there was not much sympathy among non-aligned countries when Slovenia separated from Yugoslavia. However, the NAM at that time was still an important global player. One should also recall that the Movement was instrumental in making and sustaining Yugoslavia as a credible foreign policy actor (Boeckh 2014) . This helps explain why other former Yugoslav republics were more careful in this regard. 13 During the mid-1990s, not only the Balkans were far away from Slovenian sight: as membership of the European Union (EU) and NATO evidently became the primary foreign policy goals, Slovenia was highly engaged in a two-level game with the EU in terms of bilateral conditioning of the EU accession by
Italy and Austria (Šabič 2002) . The topics on the agenda were foreigners' rights for property acquisition, the status and rights of minorities, and denationalization (Bojinović Fenko and Urlić 2015) . Additionally, a
11 The main reason for that was the 'conflict of interest'. Slovenia entered the NAC as an applicant for membership in NATO. It was subsequently 'reminded' by an influential NATO member state that several NATO members actually do have nuclear weapons, and that therefore Slovenia's application to become a NATO member was incompatible with NAC membership.
12 In fairness, this happened mainly due to limited financial and human resources. Despite being a factor of the internal foreign policy environment, the 1999
Declaration on Foreign Policy also bears strong elements of the external domestic environment, namely a completely changed self-identification.
In the Declaration, the previous identity-endangering elements of the geopolitical external foreign policy environment -in particular the geographical proximity to and historical context with the Balkans -were Post-2004 foreign policy: from steering cruisers to rowing the boat (in rough waters)
After the EU and NATO accession, Slovenia again found itself in a vacuum.
All major foreign policy goals had been accomplished, but no political reflection on the future strategic orientation seemed in sight. This internal environment factor had some important ramifications for Slovenia.
General orientations, such as development assistance and the advocacy of human rights -in particular, the rights of the child -were considered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as traditional international activities. But the non-existence of a strategic foreign policy long-term plan made way for ad hoc decisions which Šabič and Kajnč (2014) In retrospect, by holding presidencies of these international organizations, especially the EU, Slovenia took upon itself the responsibility to steer big cruisers, even though it had no knowledge, no experience, nor even sufficient capacity to do so. The presidencies took place at a time when Slovenia did not even have a foreign policy strategy of its own, and therefore no sense of the direction it would want to take in international affairs. Most importantly, it had low leadership capabilities and weak public administration as elements of the internal environment, and a lack of public support, let alone interest within the external domestic environment and the constraints of the external foreign environment in the form of the low ambitions of a small and new (member) state.
Considering these limitations, Slovenia has done a pretty good job. Save for some criticisms, especially with regard to the running of the OSCE Presidency (Šabič 2012) , the Slovenian government proved its ability to deliver responsible European leadership. The fact that Slovenia conducted the presidencies of these bodies without any major procedural flaws -no matter the approach, termed a "symbolic challenge" by Kajnč (2009) and "playing it safe" by Klemenčič (2007) -resonated well with European states (Klemenčič 2007; Lenarčič 2007; Jazbec 2008) . The procedural adequacy also boosted the image of Slovenia as a 'star pupil' of the Big Bang EU enlargement in the external domestic and foreign environment.
But there is one paradox that is often overlooked when scholars analyse Slovenian presidencies. The job was made easier to some extent, because each presiding country, notably a small one, more or less runs the ongoing presidency agendas, with relatively little space to make its own footprint.
Slovenia was no exception, but it was able to find a niche of its own. That niche was the Western Balkans. The latter were assessed among other 2008 EU presidency priorities as in fact the only true Slovenian substantive choice and contribution (Kajnč 2009 ). Considering the fact that Slovenia pursued the 'away from the Balkans' policy not so long before that, and that Slovenia increasingly saw itself as a bridge builder towards the Western Balkans, this may be seen as quite a remarkable accomplishment. really be all about -that is to say, if Slovenia wanted to assure beneficial outcomes from EU policies, it could only do so through a much more active engagement in EU policy-making with regard to issues in its interest (Bojinović Fenko 2016) . A warning was issued that the EU is not a system that would meet Slovenian values and national interests automatically, but might even jeopardize them (Lovec 2012) . We evaluate this turn as a positive one per se. The public and the government became aware of the need to work much more substantively on European (and wider)
foreign policy goals and analyse ex ante potential negative effects of international cooperation. Solidarity and equality, for example, had been reiterated as fundamental values after the Slovenian-and some governments of other EU member states -sensed that they were in an unequal position among Eurozone states as to how the Greek bailout had been handled, especially with regard to individual responsibilities (Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič 2017) . This extends more generally into the domestic external environment, as national policy-makers are now being much more directly scrutinized with respect to meeting principles of democratic governance (in terms of responsibility of individual politicians and transparency of decision-making processes), especially with regard to management of state-owned companies, implementation of anticorruption measures, rule of law and fiscal sustainability. The economic crisis thus had a huge impact on the functioning of the domestic political system due to its high dependence on EU policy-making and policies. According to Breuning's conceptualization of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) as insulated and embedded agencies, the Slovenian MFA used to be a highly insulated agency (Bojinović Fenko and Šabič 2014: 51) .
However, the preparation of this strategic document strongly reflects a change in this respect and outlines the building of a "culture of foreign policy" (Foreign Policy Strategic Document 2015: 9-10 The internal and domestic external environments were built systematically to make the necessary change from the constraints of state formation to opportunities for domestic and foreign policy action. Of course, it was the change in the external foreign environment -the fall of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the growing support in the West for democratization in former Communist countries via reinterpretation of principles of international law -that represented a great opportunity to implement plans for independence and eventually international recognition.
Conclusion
In the second period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , the main foreign policy constraint was the geopolitical and historical proximity to the war-waging former Yugoslav republics as the external domestic environment, which posed a threat to Slovenia's effort to create an image of a democratic, rule of (international) law respecting state. The external foreign environment again offered opportunities for action, albeit not necessarily always in Slovenia's favour. to certain commonly accepted policies or laws, the internal and external domestic environments would not have the capabilities (or will) to identify some major problems with the non-implementation of respect for human rights and the rule of (international) law, the very principles on which Slovenian identity is built. With regard to this period, we conclude that the foreign external environment represented itself as an opportunity to be taken, but the internal and external domestic environments became a decisive long-term constraint.
As for the post-2004 period, after NATO and EU accession, Slovenia suffered 'foreign policy fatigue' in the internal environment. The 1999 strategy, focusing primarily on achieving membership of NATO and the EU, was, with the exception of the Western Balkans and the bridge-building agenda, obsolete. Yet no document followed it. The vacuum was filled by occasional appearances in the role of holders of presidencies of international organizations. Because the Slovenialed presidencies were, by general acclaim, done well, once again the external foreign environment strengthened the image of the foreign policy of a successful state. The main constraint was primarily in the internal environment. Slovenian governments one after the other failed to provide a comprehensive reflection of Slovenia's place and direction in the world. Some ministers of foreign affairs used that 'empty space'
to their own advantage and ran personalized foreign policy agendas.
These constraints, however, are addressed in the new foreign policy strategy which Slovenia adopted in 2015. Other challenges to Slovenian foreign policy were seen, especially in the global economic and financial crisis. Paradoxically, the very environment which the state previously uncritically praised (advantages and opportunities of being a member of the EU) now pushed the decision-makers and the public to renew their self-identification and perception of EU integration. The migration crisis brought about more solo foreign policies of neighbouring states and states of wider Central and Eastern Europe, coupled with the inability of the EU to conduct resolute and consistent policy promises on migration management. This leads us to the (worrying) conclusion that the external foreign environment, which up to now has offered most opportunities for Slovenian foreign policy action, has recently become a big constraint.
This can help explain why Slovenia has reacted rather ambiguously to the migration crisis by appealing to strengthening this foreign environment via common action but at the same time refraining from its own highly self-praised human rights advocacy, moving instead to securitizing the migrant issue in domestic legislation, and, ironically, to rely more on the Western Balkans.
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